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In the Anglo-American world, race1 as a sociological concept has enduring 
weight, particularly around the concepts of group solidarity and affirmative 
action in the face of structural discrimination. Contrastingly, the French 
academic and political tradition considers the discussion of race to be 
antithetical to the French Republican conception of a national community of 
citizens in absolute equality. France cultivates an official discourse of 
universalisme or ‘race-blindness’ justified by a strict interpretation of Article 
1 of the French Constitution, which, until 2018, stated: “France shall be an 
indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the 
equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or 
religion.”2 Yet, even this reference to race—in order to disavow its 
significance to Frenchness—was deemed to be a threat to universalist 
principles. On 12 July 2018, the French National Assembly voted 
unanimously to remove the word “race” from Article 1, altering it to read 
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1 In line with Critical Race Theory (CRT), as explained by Richard Delgado and Jean 
Stefancic, I consider race to be a “product of social thoughts and relations,” “not objective, 
inherent, or fixed.” Critical Race Theory emphasises that it is the way humans have 
constructed race, by focusing on certain traits (for example, skin colour, hair texture) shared 
by some people of common origins, and ignoring other distinctly human traits (for example, 
personality, intelligence, moral behaviour), that makes race such an important object of 
study. See Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction 
(New York: New York University Press, 2017), p. 9. 
2 République Française, Constitution of October 4, 1958 (New York: French Embassy, Press 
and Information Division, 1958), p. 4. 
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“without distinction of gender, origin or religion.”3 While this change was 
justified by anti-racist sentiments, many criticised the change. Notably, 
French anti-racism activist Rokhaya Diallo described this constitutional 
change as “dangerous,” stating that “denying the existence of race means 
denying the reality of racial discrimination.”4 This conflict between French 
race-blindness, the reality of racialised violence in France, and activist 
responses to this violence is the subject of this paper.  
French people of colour have been, and continue to be, 
disproportionately impacted by police violence as opposed to white French 
people. The United States’ response to disproportionate violence against 
racialised groups was the powerful Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, 
but, despite its immediate resonance in France, the BLM campaign did not 
simply translate. Throughout this article, I will argue that this failure to 
consolidate a French BLM movement is the result of France’s official 
discourse of race-blindness, which, although ostensibly aimed to prevent 
discrimination, paralyses action against structural racism, ultimately 
undermining France’s constitutional commitment to equality. Moreover, 
because race-blindness has prevented the formulation of a Black 
consciousness, it has impeded Black grassroots organisations’ ability to form 
a French equivalent of a BLM movement. This essay will argue that a French 
BLM movement has the potential to engender critical reflection around the 
discourse of race-blindness, make public the positive aspects of organising 
around racial difference, and alter the way the French state ensures “the 
equality of all citizens.” 
This article will first address France’s response to the American BLM 
movement, as well as the reality of racialised violence in France. Secondly, 
it will explore the French state’s discourse of race-blindness. Historicising 
the construction of the discourse, it will highlight the contrast between the 
rhetoric of race-blindness as deeply rooted in France’s identity, and the 
actual recent and politicised nature of its construction. This article will then 
examine how the discourse of race-blindness justifies the occlusion of racial 
 
 
3 ‘Assembly removes word “race” from French constitution’, The Connexion (13 July, 2018), 
at https://www.connexionfrance.com/French-news/france-assembly-votes-to-remove-race-
French-constitution, accessed 12/12/2020. 
4 Rokhaya Diallo, ‘France’s dangerous move to remove “race” from its constitution’, The 
Washington Post (13 July, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-
opinions/wp/2018/07/13/frances-dangerous-move-to-remove-race-from-its-constitution/, 
accessed 12/12/2020. 
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statistics, which in other countries are essential for measuring racial 
discrimination. Next, it will investigate how some anti-racism organisations, 
as well as some Black Caribbean organisations, have internalised this 
Republican discourse of “absolute equality” through race-blindness, and 
how this prevents momentum towards a BLM-style movement. Finally, I 
will consider how some Black anti-racism organisations have rejected race-
blindness and instead celebrate a Black collective voice to counteract the 
Republic’s dedication to universalist equality. This essay will demonstrate 
that this impetus towards raising Black consciousness goes hand-in-hand 
with a consolidation of a French BLM movement, and how, by reclaiming 
discourse around race as necessary to anti-racism, it has the potential to 
transform France’s conceptualisation of equality.  
 
The Resonance of #BlackLivesMatter in France  
In September 2016, Al Jazeera published an article entitled ‘In France, Black 
Lives Matter has become a rallying cry’. Indeed, following the death of 
Adama Traoré, a young Black French man, in police custody on 19 July 
2016, protests broke out for several weeks in Paris, and the slogans 
#BLMFrance and #Justicepouradama went viral on Twitter within France.5 
The protest, which took place four days after Traoré’s death, was also 
reported in The Washington Post as “France’s first-ever Black Lives Matter 
demonstration.”6 These protests clearly resembled the structure and style of 
American BLM protests. Demonstrating in the centre of Paris, protestors 
wore shirts emblazoned with slogans including “Justice pour Adama: sans 
justice vous n’aurez jamais la paix” (“Justice for Adama: Without justice, 
you will never have peace” [my translation]) and chanted “Black Lives 
Matter.”7 Similarly, on 2 February 2017, Théo L.,8 a twenty-two year old 
Black man, was assaulted and raped by police, prompting protests by 
 
 
5 Nabeela Zahir, ‘In France, Black Lives Matter Has Become a Rallying Cry’, Al Jazeera (2 
September, 2016), at https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/08/france-black-
lives-matter-rallying-cry-160818103854211.html, accessed 12/12/2020.  
6 James McAuley, ‘Black Lives Matter movement comes to France. But will it translate?’, 
The Washington Post (8 August, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/black-lives-
matter-movement-comes-to-france-but-will-it-translate/2016/08/07/7606567e-58cd-11e6-
8b48-0cb344221131_story.html, accessed 12/12/2020. 
7 Zahir, ‘In France, Black Lives Matter Has Become a Rallying Cry’. 
8 Name withheld from media for privacy reasons. 
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hundreds of people the following week, and trending slogans of 
#Justicepourtheo and #Justicepouradama.9   
The reporting around these protests explicitly challenged the French 
discourse of race-blindness. Underscoring the hollowness of the French 
tripartite motto (liberté, égalité, fraternité), demonstrators expressed 
sentiments of a racial fraternité at odds with the State, epitomised in one 
unnamed protestor’s assertion that “The French police are killing our 
brothers.”10 In a statement on the protests, Yasser Louati, a Parisian civil 
liberties and human rights activist, similarly highlighted the hostile 
relationship between racialised groups and the French police, framing the 
response to Traoré’s death as the result of accumulated resentment after years 
of injustice.11 Describing the police as an “occupying force,” Louati 
explained that “people are marching today … because resentment is very, 
very profound. Look at how people do not trust the initial police statement, 
nor the second. They just do not trust the police.”12 Writing for the 
Washington Post, James McAuley positioned the protests around Traoré’s 
death as a continuation of the sentiment expressed in the three weeks of 
rioting following the November 2005 deaths of two teenagers, Zyed Benna 
and Bouna Traoré, both young men of colour electrocuted while fleeing a 
police identity check.13 Moreover, McAuley described the French BLM-
style protests around Traoré’s death as a “turning point,” and as “calling into 
question this long-held ideology of national identity … to suggest that race, 
perhaps, has mattered all along.”14 
Thus, it seems that French protestors not only identify a resonance 
with the United States BLM movement, based on transnational similarities 
between disproportionate deaths of Black people in police custody, but also 
position their protests as responding to the failure of the France’s race-blind 
approach to protect Black lives. However, despite these initial protests and 
momentum-building by some organisations, a French BLM movement failed 
to consolidate itself, and largely fell out of press coverage until June 2020, 
 
 
9 ‘Justice for Théo: Protests erupt after police rape’, Al Jazeera (6 February, 2017), at 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/justice-theo-protests-erupt-police-rape-
170206161606495.html, accessed 12/12/2020. 
10 Zahir, ‘In France, Black Lives Matter Has Become a Rallying Cry’.  
11 Zahir, ‘In France, Black Lives Matter Has Become a Rallying Cry’. 
12 Zahir, ‘In France, Black Lives Matter Has Become a Rallying Cry’. 
13 McAuley, ‘Black Lives Matter movement comes to France’. 
14 McAuley, ‘Black Lives Matter movement comes to France’. 
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when French BLM protests reignited in response to the murder of George 
Floyd, to considerable international press coverage. These 2020 protests, 
notably spearheaded by Assa Traoré, the sister of Adama, saw tens of 
thousands of people around France marching in honour of both Floyd and 
Adama Traoré, in defiance of Covid-19 lockdown orders.15 In McAuley’s 
coverage of the June 2020 protests in The Washington Post, he invoked 
France’s “unique relationship to race,” in particular its occlusion of racial 
statistics and ban on the word ‘race’ from the Constitution.16 Moreover, Cole 
Stangler, writing for the UK Tribune Magazine about the protests, compared 
the French and “Anglo-Saxon” approaches to ethnic difference, emphasising 
the gap between France’s espoused “colourblind[ness]” and the reality of 
racial violence.17  
Given the evident modelling of the burgeoning French BLM 
movement on its American counterpart, it is unsurprising to see persistent 
comparison of the French protests to those in the USA in press coverage. 
However, significant differences remain between the American and French 
movements. The American BLM movement, organised by “adaptive and 
decentralised … guiding principles” set out in a Global Network 
Infrastructure, has established forty chapters across North America across 
seven years.18 Contrastingly, no guiding principles, website, or consolidated 
media presence have been developed by leaders of a French BLM 
movement. This, I argue, is likely to be a result of the continued dominance 
of France’s race-blind model of absolute equality, which prevents the 
collection of statistics concerning race, including statistics around racial 
profiling and the racialised nature of police violence, and considers action 
around racial identity as a communitarian threat to French national unity.  
 
 
15 Lauren Collins, ‘Assa Traoré and the fight for black lives in France’, The New Yorker (18 
June, 2020), at https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-europe/assa-traore-and-the-
fight-for-black-lives-in-france, accessed 12/12/2020.  
16 James McAuley, ‘The woman behind France’s Black Lives Matter movement wants a race-
blind society to recognize its racism’, The Washington Post (18 June, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/assa-traore-black-lives-matter-france/ 
2020/06/12/45c0f450-aa87-11ea-a43b-be9f6494a87d_story.html, accessed 12/12/2020.   
17 Cole Stangler, ‘France’s Black Lives Matter Movement’, Tribune Magazine (21 June, 
2020), at https://tribunemag.co.uk/2020/06/frances-black-lives-matter-movement/, accessed 
12/12/2020.  
18 ‘Herstory - Black Lives Matter’, Black Lives Matter (September 2019), 
https://blacklivesmatter.com/herstory/, accessed 12/12/2020. 
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Race-blindness: A Naturalised Discourse 
Race-blindness, a discourse of alleged ignorance to race which asserts that 
race has no more bearing on one’s trajectory in life than, for example, height, 
has been naturalised as the inevitable result of France’s Republican 
particularity. However, Adrian Favell suggests in his Philosophies of 
Integration that the “public philosophy” of race-blindness is not a “historical 
cultural idiom,” the term given by American commentator Rogers Brubaker, 
but rather a “theory at pains to mask the recentness and artificiality of its 
construction.”19 Indeed, race-blindness is a powerful constructed discourse 
which dominates contemporary French politics, policies, and popular 
discourse.  
Describing race-blindness as a “constitutional tenet of the French 
Republic,” Vanessa Thompson suggests that the universalist ideals of French 
nationhood trace back to the post-French Revolution Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789).20 Notably, Article 3 of the 
Declaration states: “The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the 
nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not 
proceed directly from the nation.”21 As suggested in Article 3, French 
citizens are expected to value their French nationality above any religious or 
racial particularities. Further, the French concept of citizenship is based on 
nationality and nativity to France. Suzanne Citron explains that unlike the 
German concept of citizenship based on ius sanguinis (the right of blood), 
French citizenship, as per the first “code of nationality” of 1889, is based on 
the notion of ius solis (the right of the land).22 Thus, the French nation is, 
theoretically, united not by shared parentage, but by “French values” and 
shared community participation in France.23 By framing race as a biological 
detail, based on bonds of blood which are theoretically irrelevant to French 
Republican citizenship, France reinforces its claim of indifference to race.   
 
 
19 Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in 
France and Britain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. 43. 
20 Vanessa E. Thompson, ‘Black Jacobins in Contemporary France: On Identities on Politics, 
Decolonial Critique, and the Other Blackness’, Sociological Focus, vol. 49, no. 1 (2015), p. 
46. 
21 National Assembly of France, Declaration of the Rights of Man - 1789 (New Haven: Lillian 
Goldman Law Library, 2008). 
22 Suzanne Citron, ‘Le mythe national et l'accueil des étrangers’, Autres Temps. Les cahiers 
du christianisme social, vol. 38 (1993), p. 112. 
23 Citron, ‘Le mythe national et l’accueil des étrangers’, pp. 112-113. 
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Race-blindness is also entangled in universalism, popular racialism, 
and Enlightenment thinking. In On Human Diversity, Tzvetan Todorov 
explains the role of prominent French philosophers, including Renan, Le 
Bon, Gobineau and Taine, in fostering a popular understanding of humanity 
as constituted of three races—white, yellow and black.24 Moreover, Todorov 
identifies that this “popular racism” coexisted with, and indeed influenced, 
Enlightenment ideals of universalist humanism.25 Trica Keaton extends 
Todorov’s observation, arguing that:  
The Enlightenment … becomes pivotal in the archaeology of ‘race’ in 
France not only for the ways in which its doctrines of universalism 
and humanism structured French Republicanism and, thereby, its 
ideals of ‘race-blindness’, but also for its universalising assertions that 
encoded whiteness (and maleness) as normative, and ‘blackness’ as a-
normative.26  
Thompson reinforces Keaton’s assertion that Enlightenment universalism 
does not counteract or exclude discourses of popular racism. She argues that 
racial categories exist both in French society and French politics, and 
highlights that “the construction and racialisation of black/of colour bodies 
was intrinsic to the constitution of an abstract universalism underlying the 
formation of the French Republic.”27 France, in espousing a universalist 
notion of equality, both ignores perspectives and experiences it considers a-
normative, and discounts the role of racist discourses in formulating 
universalism, blinding itself to the reality of racial inequality within a 
supposedly race-blind French society.  
This official discourse of race-blindness is also intertwined with 
immigration policy. Indeed, Favell considers race-blindness to be the result 
of a nationalist project which he calls the “myth of republican citizenship,” 
particularly invoked in relation to the discourse around immigration in the 
1980s which led to the strategy of intégration.28 Favell writes:  
France is peculiar … for taking as the axial focus of social re-
integration a group which may always play a highly symbolic role in 
 
 
24 Tzvetan Todorov, On Human Diversity: Nationalism, racism, and exoticism in French 
thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 106. 
25 Todorov, On Human Diversity, p. 106.  
26 Trica D. Keaton, ‘The Politics of Race-Blindness: (Anti)Blackness and Category-Blindness 
in Contemporary France’, Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race, vol. 7, no. 1 
(2010), p. 112. 
27 Thompson, ‘Black Jacobins in Contemporary France’, p. 46. 
28 Favell, Philosophies of Integration, p. 43. 
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problematizing questions of national order and identity, but need not 
necessarily be the central question: les immigrés.29  
Dena Montague explains that intégration was initially promoted by left wing 
intellectuals in an effort “to regain control of discourse on immigration and 
difference.”30 Indeed, intégration was enacted into strategy under a 
cohabitation government (Socialist President, Conservative Prime Minister), 
with the creation of the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (HCI) by Socialist Prime 
Minister Michel Rocard in March 1990.31 Notably, upon creating the HCI, 
Rocard proclaimed  the “right of difference” (droit à la différence) to be dead 
and the new focus of progressive policy to be the “right of indifference” 
(droit à l’indifférence).32 Rocard clarified the position of HCI towards 
cultural difference, stating: “We need to define a policy of integration … that 
accepts the particular differences of geographic origin … I do mean accept 
that difference, not cultivate it” (my translation).33  
Escalating fears of islamicisme in the 1990s, particularly after the 
1989 “headscarf affair” in which three Muslim girls were expelled from their 
(public) secondary school for refusing to remove their Islamic headscarves, 
tilted intégration towards assimilationism.34 This trend intensified under 
President Jacques Chirac’s right-wing government in the 1990s.35 The 
intégration consensus was further solidified as anti-racism groups like S.O.S. 
Racisme, the last major source of dissent to the intégration model, adopted 
this Republican framing of universal rights and equality.36 Thus, it was the 
consensus across political parties, popular opinion and even anti-racism 
groups that built this “myth of republican citizenship,” which requires 
sacrificing expression of cultural difference to “integrate” into the national 
 
 
29 Favell, Philosophies of Integration, p. 151. 
30 Dena Montague, ‘Communitarianism, discourse and political opportunity in Republican 
France’, French Cultural Studies, vol. 24, no. 2 (2013), p. 223. 
31 Favell, Philosophies of Integration, p. 55.  
32 Favell, Philosophies of Integration, p. 155. 
33 “Il s’agit donc de définir une politique d’intégration … accueillante à cette différence 
particulière qu’est l’origine géographique … J’ai bien dit accueillir la différence, et non pas 
la cultiver.” Michel Rocard, ‘Declaration of M. Michel Rocard, Prime Minister, on the 
integration of immigrants and the role of the Haut Conseil à l'Intégration’ (speech, Creation 
of the Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, Paris, 9 March 1990), at https://www.vie-
publique.fr/discours/195748-declaration-de-m-michel-rocard-premier-ministre-sur-
lintegration-des, accessed 12/12/2020.  
34 Favell, Philosophies of Integration, p. 154. 
35 Favell, Philosophies of Integration, p. 154.  
36 Favell, Philosophies of Integration, p. 155.  
Literature & Aesthetics 30 (2) 2020 
 
 100 
cultural project and the prevailing understanding of French nationality. 
French Republicanism is thus exercised both by the state, which actively 
constructs, naturalises and reinforces the myth of equality without difference, 
and by its citizens, who have internalised this naturalised Republican myth.  
 
Rendering Lives and Deaths Invisible: State Race-Blind Violence 
Against Black French People 
Race-blindness is not only a political touchstone but made a legal and 
sociological reality through France’s prohibition of the collection of official 
nation-wide racial statistics. This lens is further entrenched through 
academic tradition, notably through what Patrick Simon, a sociologist and 
advocate for the employment of racial statistics in the cause of anti-
discrimination, calls a “reluctance in French social sciences to use the 
semantic field of ethnicity and race.”37 The French state considers gathering 
statistics on race to be inconsistent with France’s constitutional principle of 
absolute equality. Indeed, such statistics were made explicitly illegal in a 
1978 data protection law, which states that “The collection and processing 
of personal data that reveals, directly or indirectly, the racial and ethnic 
origins … of persons … is prohibited.”38 France justifies this prohibition by 
emphasising the danger of racial statistics falling into the hands of racists, 
and by suggesting that enumerating the racial makeup of France could cause 
the nation to fracture. Notably, sociologist Dominique Schnapper supports 
this latter position, arguing that statistics “contribute to the creation of social 
reality by embodying the perception that a society has of itself.”39 Thus, she 
sees racial statistics as dividing France, embodying one side of the racial 
statistics debate. 
However, the lack of national racial statistics makes minorities, and 
the discrimination they face, invisible. Indeed, Simon argues that France is 
“choosing ignorance” by outlawing such statistics.40 He states,  
 
 
37 Patrick Simon, ‘Statistics, French Social Sciences and Ethnic and Racial Social 
Relations’, Revue française de sociologie, vol. 51, no. 5 (2010), p. 159. 
38 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, Act No.78-17 of 6 January 1978 
On Information Technology, Data Files and Civil Liberties (Paris: République Française, 
1978), p. 10. 
39 Dominique Schnapper, ‘Etats des lieux, état des problèmes,’ in Actes du Colloque 
Statistiques Ethniques: Synthèse des Interventions, ed. Centre d'Analyse Stratégique (Paris: 
Centre d’Analyse Stratégique, 2007), p. 6.  
40 Simon, ‘Statistics, French social sciences and ethnic and racial social relations’, p. 162.  
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French society is as thoroughly structured by ethnic and ‘race’-based 
social relations as American society. The ‘French exception’ among 
multicultural societies is founded on radical obfuscation of ethnic and 
racial divisions; a move that helps sustain the performative fiction of 
‘indifference to differences’.41  
Indeed, like Schnapper, Simon considers statistics as contributing to a social 
reality. However, he also recognises that ignoring the social reality of racial 
identity has disguised racial discrimination. He explains, 
It may seem paradoxical to adopt the strategy of mobilising—with 
great care, and only temporarily—categories that break up 
universality … However, we already have ample evidence of how the 
opposite option, advocated by supporters of a certain integration 
model tradition that consists in promoting universalism by rendering 
ethnic and racial labels invisible, actually conceals discrimination.42  
This aligns with Keaton’s assertion that, “not only does race-blindness deny 
the obvious, but when it is law or policy, deprived of historical context, it 
strips anti-racists of the rhetorical weapons they need to battle racial 
oppression.”43 Gathering official nation-wide statistics on self-identification 
with racial categories, and on experiences of racial discrimination, has the 
potential to disrupt the vision of France as a predominately white nation and 
reframe French national identity in a more inclusive way.  
The absence of racial statistics also means that discrimination on the 
basis of race is mistaken for other forms of discrimination, from xenophobic 
discrimination against “foreigners,” to regional stereotyping, particularly of 
the residents of the banlieues on the outskirts of Paris. Simon highlights that 
“statistical categories are first and foremost conventions that both designate 
objects of knowledge and target groups for action and policy.”44 As a result, 
French social scientists, using the “nationality” statistics available to them, 
conceive of sociological difference in terms of nationality, thus 
“reproduc[ing] the French preference for nationality as the paramount 
criterion for categorising otherness.”45 There are two major consequences of 
this: (1) statistically, the difference of second-generation immigrants who 
may be both ‘black’ and ‘French’ is rendered invisible; (2) in practice, non-
white French citizens are perceived as non-French, and thus may be the target 
 
 
41 Simon, ‘Statistics, French social sciences and ethnic and racial social relations’, p. 162. 
42 Simon, ‘Statistics, French social sciences and ethnic and racial social relations’, p. 163. 
43 Keaton, ‘Racial Profiling and the “French Exception,”’ p. 237.  
44 Simon, ‘Statistics, French social sciences and ethnic and racial social relations’, p. 160.  
45 Simon, ‘Statistics, French social sciences and ethnic and racial social relations’, p. 160. 
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of xenophobia. As such, regardless of whether they managed to achieve 
citizenship, Black French people are treated as secondary citizens. It seems 
that race, rather than nationality, is the reason for the discrimination 
experienced by Black people in France, who may be French citizens as much 
as they may be immigrants. Yet, France renders race invisible by professing 
universalist equality, rendering the notion that someone could be both Black 
and French inconceivable. As Jean Beaman articulates, “whiteness as 
synonymous with Frenchness relies on being black as the opposite of being 
French.”46 Thus, the refusal to countenance categories beyond nationality 
means than French Black people are not seen as French.  
Further, occlusion of racial statistics has paralysed action against 
racial profiling. Indeed, while the French Republic refuses to consider race 
as a category, its agents, the police, cause disproportionate harm to Black 
people in France. This is particularly evident in considering how Black 
people (and other “visible minorities”) are affected by “random” stop-and-
searches or identity checks, known in France as contrôle de faciès. Studies 
by Fabien Jobard and René Lévy have shown that “black people were 
between 3.3. and 11.5 times more likely than whites to be stopped; while 
Arabs were stopped between 1.8 and 14.8 more times than whites.”47 
Moreover, Lévy notes that Black people are more often taken to police 
stations following contrôles au faciès, and that police are rarely punished for 
abuse of their powers.48 Yet, the State’s response to what appears to be racial 
profiling by police has been insufficient and failed to destigmatise discussion 
of race in the cause of anti-racism. For instance, President François Hollande 
declared himself committed to fighting against racism around stop-and-
searches while standing for election in 2012, stating: “I will fight not against 
identity controls, which are necessary. I will fight against ‘racial profiling’, 
which is unacceptable. I will fight against all discrimination, discrimination 
due to age, colour, origins, or neighbourhood as well as sexual orientation.”49 
However, when elected, Hollande’s Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault and 
 
 
46 Jean Beaman, ‘Are French people white?: Towards an understanding of whiteness in 
Republican France’, Identities, vol. 26, no. 5 (2019), p. 552. 
47 Fabien Jobard and René Lévy, Profiling Minorities: A Study of Stop-and-Search Practices 
in Paris (New York: Open Society Institute, 2009), p. 28. 
48 René Lévy, Wrong Colour, Wrong Clothes: Accounts of Ethnic Profiling in France and 
United States (New York: Open Society Institute, 2009). 
49 Quoted in Trica D. Keaton, ‘Racial profiling and the “French exception,”’ French Cultural 
Studies, vol. 24, no. 2 (2013), p. 231. 
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Minister of the Interior Manuel Valls abandoned the proposed reform of 
contrôle au faciès which had the potential to hold police accountable for 
racial profiling by mandating records of identity checks.50 The French State 
recognised the problem and proposed action, but failed to follow through, 
thus preventing progress against racial discrimination in identity checks.  
More optimistically, the High Court decision on the first French class 
action alleging racial profiling against the Ministry of the Interior and the 
French police force, which aimed to make racial profiling legally 
recognisable in France, was handed down in November 2016. It condemned 
the State, declaring that it considered “an identity check based on the 
physical characteristics associated to a real or supposed origin, without any 
preliminary objective justification, is discriminatory: such would be a serious 
offence” (my translation).51 Moreover, in response, the National 
Consultative Commission of Human Rights has recommended that identity 
checks are made accountable through “a system of traceability, permitting 
the person subjected to the identity control to receive a document attesting 
to the control” (my translation).52 However, despite making racial profiling 
undeniably unlawful, this result has yet to change the discourse around race 
in France. Race-blindness remains the official discourse, limiting recourse 
for State violence like racial profiling, and denying minorities the tools and 
language needed to fight against this violence.  
A related problem to this dearth of national statistics of the racial 
makeup of France is the lack of statistics around deaths in custody, statistics 
which would add crucial legitimacy to the growth of the nascent French 
BLM movement. Unlike the database of deaths in custody compiled by The 
Washington Post in the USA, France has limited data on deaths resulting 
from police interventions. Aiming to “open the debate on a subject which 
seems a taboo,” Ivan du Roy and Ludo Simbille of Basta! media have 
attempted to record all deaths that have taken place after police intervention 
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since 17 October 1961.53 Significantly, du Roy and Simbille have identified 
a “portrait-type” of the 320 persons that they have recorded as killed by the 
police since 1961: “a Black or Arab man, living in a low socio-economic 
suburb around Île de France [greater Paris] or Lyon, aged from 25 to 30 years 
old” (my translation).54 While the lack of official statistics on deaths in 
custody renders these numbers and profile shakier than would be desired, it 
appears that Black and Arab men are disproportionately killed in police 
custody. Mandating an official generation of statistics around deaths in 
police custody would centralise data around the racialised nature of deaths 
in custody, making this data accessible and actionable for more citizens and 
policy makers, and challenging the dominant discourse of race-blindness.  
 
The Internalisation of Race-blindness by Black and Anti-racism 
Organisations in France  
Race-blindness paralyses action against structural racism by rendering 
statistically invisible the discrimination faced by French people of colour. 
Moreover, it silences those who would speak out about their experiences of 
racial discrimination by accusing them of “communitarianism,” accusations 
which, Montague asserts, “delegitimise public inquiry into race-based 
institutional inequality.”55 Gado Alzouma describes this paralysis as a 
“double-bind” that conditions inertia and “consign[s] Blacks to a state of 
limbo, where for all practical purposes they are a non-category.”56 However, 
breaking through this double-bind is made more difficult when racialised 
communities themselves defend the discourse of race-blindness. In fact, two 
of the most established anti-racism organisations in France, S.O.S. Racisme 
and Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires (CRAN) engage with 
Republican race-blindness. 
Both S.O.S. Racisme and CRAN fight against racism without 
acknowledging race. They are clearly caught in Alzouma’s double-bind, and 
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moreover have been “polarised” by the debate on ethno-racial statistics.57 
S.O.S. Racisme, created in 1984, was the predominant anti-racist association 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. As an organisation, it is not tied to a 
particular community, and aligns itself with a universalist approach to anti-
racism.58 Montague writes that S.O.S. Racisme “shifted the rhetoric on anti-
racism towards two main platforms: firstly, a symbolic call for an end to 
racism, and secondly towards legislative action on immigrant rights, 
particularly the right to vote.”59 However, while its discourse of multicultural 
anti-racism was initially accepted by the State, S.O.S. Racisme also 
advocated for the droit à la différence, which, in a political climate shifting 
towards the right, came to be seen as a threat to Republicanism. As such, 
S.O.S. Racisme came to deracialise its approach to anti-racism and has 
lobbied against the use of race as a category as well as the collection of racial 
statistics. Indeed, a petition it circulated in November 2007 advocated 
against the gathering of racial statistics within the frame of “studies designed 
to measure diversity … integration, and discrimination,” and demanded the 
removal of questions on skin colour and ethnicity in the national survey, 
Trajectoires et origins.60  
Contrastingly, CRAN has actively lobbied for statistics measuring 
diversity and discriminations as well as affirmative action strategies, 
declaring on its website that “Le CRAN a lancé en France le débat sur les 
statistiques de la diversité qui, seules, permettent de mesurer les 
discriminations raciales” (“CRAN launched the French debate on diversity 
statistics which alone enable the measurement of racial discrimination” [my 
translation]).61 Indeed, they have themselves conducted surveys on 
experiences of racism. Moreover, CRAN, purporting to represent “des 
associations noires” (Black associations) clearly employs the label ‘Black’ 
in order to fight against specifically anti-black discrimination. In a 2007 
round table, Patrick Lozès, the President of CRAN, explained that the use of 
the label “noir” was a calculated choice:  
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We initially preferred the expression ‘residents and citizens of Sub-
Saharan African and overseas departments and territories’. Then we 
considered that if we were discriminated against, it is not because of 
our country of origin or because the origin of our parents, but because 
we had black skin [my translation].62  
Yet CRAN, like S.O.S. Racisme, opposes the nomenclature of ‘race’. Indeed, 
Lozès describes blackness only in terms of phenotypical appearance, 
declaring in a 2007 meeting with the National Council on Statistical 
Information:  
I wish we could definitively expel from our vocabulary this 
‘ethnoracial categories’ phrase that relies on concepts which our 
history and our morality of science itself reject. Races do not exist, 
and I don’t think ethnicity is a relevant concept in the French context 
… Skin colour is a simple basic fact, like hair colour, height, or 
weight.63  
Lozès’ reduction of blackness to a phenotype is presumably motivated by a 
desire to denounce the demonstrably false concept of “biological” race which 
suggests that people of certain races, because of their bloodline or parentage, 
are naturally inferior to other races. However, its dismissal of the 
racialisation of darker skin pigmentation has the effect of excusing the 
French state for centuries of oppression, exploitation and discrimination 
against Black people through colonisation, imperialism, slavery, harsh 
immigration policies and structural racism.  
CRAN’s identification of “black skin” as the reason for 
discrimination, but rejection of the term and concept of “race,” speaks to the 
limited way in which CRAN mobilises Blackness in order to avoid 
accusations of communitarianism. Pap Ndiaye, member of the scientific 
council of CRAN, explains that CRAN organises around an “identité fine” 
(“thin identity”) based on the most common denominator of “Black people 
in France,” rather than an “identité épaisse” (“thick identity”) based on 
shared culture, country of origin, or experience.64 In fearing accusations of 
communitarianism, CRAN only pragmatically asserts its Black identity. 
Keaton suggests that this “thin” mobilisation of Blackness could be 
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considered what Gayatri Spivak, in her book In Other Worlds (1987), termed 
“strategic essentialism”: that is, group identity used as a basis of a struggle 
against oppression, not for community formation.65 However, Keaton argues 
that it is community formation, rather than “strategic essentialism,” that 
works as an “effective mechanism for self and group preservation in hostile 
racialised societies.”66 Indeed, CRAN’s mobilisation of the “thin identity” of 
shared black skin colour has notably failed to engage French Caribbean 
organisations, a significant Black French minority.  
Moreover, it appears that Republican race-blindness has been so 
internalised by French Caribbean people within the metropole that many 
French Caribbean migrant organisations do not affiliate themselves with 
other Black or anti-racism organisations. Audrey Célestine highlights that 
organisations of French Caribbean people living in France, the most 
prominent of which are Collectif Départements d’Outre-Mer (Collectif 
DOM) and Comité Marche du 23 Mai 1998 (CM98), have had largely 
negative responses to claims of a rising “Black question” by journalists and 
scholars.67 Seemingly persuaded by the Republican ideal of absolute 
equality, these French Caribbean organisations seem to prefer focusing on 
their citizenship shared with France and the Overseas Departments and 
Territories, than the “Blackness” and immigrant experience that they share 
with many immigrants, and children of immigrants, living in France. 
Collectif DOM and CM98 were formed in response to a perceived 
negation of the importance of slavery to Black Caribbeans in the 
commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the abolition of slavery in 1998, 
encapsulated by the official motto “Tous nés en 1848” (“All born in 1848”).68 
This motto was offensive to Black French Caribbeans because, despite the 
motto’s implication, only Black people trafficked to the French Caribbean, 
and their descendants, had suffered slavery. Slavery is extremely powerful 
in French Caribbean collective memory, with CM98 organising annual 
events commemorating of the abolition of slavery, which centre retellings of 
family histories of slavery.69 Further, this reference to “All” was offensive to 
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some Black French Caribbean people and groups because they did not want 
to be homogenised into a “Black identity” defined on the basis of skin colour.  
According to Célestine, French Caribbean nationals present 
themselves as a special group, even a “model minority,” with greater historic 
claim to French identity than immigrants and their descendants.70 Thus, 
while Black French Caribbean people do suffer from racial and xenophobic 
discrimination in France, as they are perceived as foreigners through the 
conflation of Frenchness with whiteness described by Beaman, they seem 
reluctant to read this discrimination as ‘racial’. Moreover, they would prefer 
to focus on their national cultural particularities than on their racial fraternity 
with other Black people in France. This focus on nationality, as Célestine 
emphasises, limits the potential for their involvement in Black collective 
action against racism. She assesses: “In the long run, French Caribbeans thus 
seem doomed to have a minor role in French identity politics … by focusing 
solely on the French Caribbean population, they restrict the social bases of 
their antidiscrimination movement.”71 French Caribbean endorsement of 
race-blindness, alongside their desire to differentiate themselves from other 
Black French people, jeopardises the consolidation of a French BLM-style 
movement, a movement with the potential to challenge systematic racism in 
France.  
 
Mobilising race to fight racism: Brigade Anti-Négrophobie 
Not all Black and anti-racism organisations in France have embraced race-
blindness. Notably, Brigade Anti-Négrophobie (BAN), a major participant in 
the current French BLM movement, actively draws attention to the racialised 
experiences of Black people in France and clearly sets itself against 
‘negrophobia’ (anti-black racism).72 Thompson, in studying the potential for 
the mobilisation of a Black collective voice in the cause of anti-racism in 
France, argues that BAN is instrumental in pushing the shift in French 
discourse on race towards open debate on the “black condition.”73 She explains 
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that BAN actively draws on a critical concept of race in its construction of a 
“dynamic, inclusive” concept of “blackness,” which is “uncoupled from fixed 
conceptions of an essential black subject.”74 Crucially BAN’s demographic is 
younger, and members predominantly come from poor, urban and youth 
segments of the population, most notably from the Parisian banlieues where 
uprisings against police violence against minorities have been situated.75 
Thompson suggests that BAN’s notion of collectivity is close to what Angela 
Davis called “identities on politics”; that is, “basing the identity on politics 
rather than the politics on identity,” ideal for the building of a political 
movement.76 In creating a concept of Blackness that is neither exclusive to 
certain nationalities like CM98 and Collectif DOM, nor merely “strategic” like 
CRAN, BAN is able to challenge the norms of French society that prevent the 
problematisation of race and enshrine race-blindness as normative.  
BAN explores a dynamic concept of identity, engaging with 
discourses of transnationality, intersectionality and hybridisation. Indeed, 
Thompson suggests that BAN provides an “instructive position” for how to 
straddle the “double bind of similarities and difference”: its members 
understand Blackness as transcending essentialisms, but still consider a bond 
between Black communities in France despite their differences.77 Thompson 
suggests that BAN’s detachment from binary logics leads to a nuanced and 
anti-essentialist understanding that “blackness should be uncoupled from 
fixed conceptions of the essential black subject, a perspective in which 
blackness is constantly re- and trans-formed.”78 Thus, BAN presents the 
potential for modelling the mobilisation of a Black collective voice against 
negrophobic violence, particularly that inflicted by police and implicitly 
condoned by the State, a remodelling which could address the discrimination 
towards Black bodies in France despite the discourse of race-blindness.  
In the consolidation of a French BLM movement, organisations like 
BAN have the potential to articulate a Black collective voice that speaks out 
against the erasure of Black identities by France’s race-blind concept of 
nationality and citizenship. Indeed, it is clear that even as France doubles down 
on its erasure of race, for instance in its 2013 suppression of the words “race” 
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and “racial” from the French Penal Code,79 the work of the scholars and 
journalists discussed here makes clear that France’s construction of race-
blindness is breaking down. As embodied in BAN’s much younger 
membership, demographic change is altering the attitude towards race by 
French Black people themselves.  
Indeed, Abdoulaye Gueye highlights that the increase in “resources” for 
self-organisation around Black identity in France have been decisive in the 
shift towards the potential emergence of a non-essentialised Black collective 
voice, crucial for a consolidated BLM-style movement.80 He emphasises the 
significance of greater numbers of highly-educated Black people rooted by 
family and geographically concentrated in some areas of France for the 
emergence of a dynamic and motivated Black collective voice against 
racism.81 The mobilisation of a coherent, political Black identity based on race 
consciousness rather than race-blindness, as modelled by BAN, has the 
potential to both reclaim race in the fight against racism, and to challenge the 




France, like most countries with histories of colonisation, empire and 
slavery, has a racism problem. As this article has explained, its discourse of 
race-blindness allows it to misidentify this race problem, especially when the 
agents of the French state are the racist actors. France’s idealist myths of 
Republican citizenship based on universalist notions of absolute equality 
have been naturalised as culturally specific bases for race-blind public 
discourse and policy, allegedly embedded in France’s national identity. 
Supported by actors across France’s political spectrum, race-blindness, 
particularly mobilised around immigration policy in the 1980s, has been the 
status quo for decades. Yet race-blindness is, as Favell emphasises, a “myth,” 
a discourse that has been constructed, deliberately disseminated in policy and 
internalised by the French public. As the harms of race-blindness are 
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recognised, this myth can be questioned and deconstructed, so that race can 
be recognised as the reason for racist actions.  
Indeed, as explored here, questions of race and blackness are current 
topics of debate in France, threatening the still predominant race taboo. 
Moreover, some anti-racism groups, notably BAN, have broken with the status 
quo by aligning themselves with racialised communities and racial identities. 
Their efforts were encouraged and thrown into sharper relief by international 
press in the context of the American BLM movement, indicating the growing 
importance of international discourses of race for the French consciousness. 
While, due to France’s institutional and historical factors, French BLM-style 
protests around police brutality have not yet consolidated into a movement the 
size of the American BLM, they did highlight popular will for a movement 
that recognises race as a factor in police abuse of power. Moreover, they 
indicated a dissatisfaction with the race-blind model of equality which refuses 
to acknowledge that racialised groups in France experience discrimination 
because of their race, and to make policy accordingly. Modelled on the work 
of groups like BAN, the emergence of a Black collective consciousness in a 
consolidated French BLM movement could lead to a more inclusive concept 
of French nationality, citizenship, and make France’s constitutional claim of 
“the equality of all citizens before the law” a lived reality. 82 
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